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The Ultimatum Game (UG) is an economic game where two players (proposer and 
responder) decide how to split a certain amount of money. While traditional economic 
theories based on rational decision making predict that the proposer should make a 
minimal offer and the responder should accept it, human subjects tend to behave 
more fairly in UG. Previous studies suggested that extra information such as 
reputation, empathy, or spatial structure is needed for fairness to evolve in UG. Here 
we show that fairness can evolve without additional information if players make 
decisions probabilistically and may continue interactions when the offer is rejected, 
which we call the Not Quite Ultimatum Game (NQUG). Evolutionary simulations of 
NQUG showed that the probabilistic decision making contributes to the increase of 
proposers’ offer amounts to avoid rejection, while the repetition of the game works to 
responders’ advantage because they can wait until a good offer comes. These simple 
extensions greatly promote evolution of fairness in both proposers’ offers and 
responders’ acceptance thresholds. 
 
 
 
 
 
While traditional economic theories assumed that individuals are generally rational and 
self-interested, it has often been experimentally observed that real humans behave rather 
irrationally [1, 2]. The Ultimatum Game (UG) [3] is one such example in which player’s 
behaviors contradict between theoretical prediction and experimental observation.  
In UG, two players, a proposer and a responder, are to split a certain amount of money 
given to them. The proposer can make only one offer to the responder about how to split 
the money. If the responder accepts the offer, the money will be split between them 
accordingly. If the responder rejects the offer, neither player receives anything. A rational, 
profit-maximizing responder should accept any small yet non-zero offer, because 
acceptance is always better than rejection that would give him nothing. Therefore, a 
rational, profit-maximizing proposer who believes that the responder is also rational should 
claim almost the entire amount, leaving only a tiny fraction for the responder. 
Straightforward computer simulations of evolutionary UG have shown that these rational 
strategies do evolve naturally [4]. 
However, it has been observed in a large number of experimental studies that this is not 
how real humans actually behave in this game [5-10]. Instead, most proposers tend to 
offer a fair share to their responders, usually offering 40 to 50%, while responders 
frequently reject offers below 30%. It is also known that these percentages show 
significant variations across different countries and cultures [6, 9]. We also had conducted 
a scenario experiment of UG in the past, which showed that the average amount of 
proposers’ offers was 46.7 % and the average threshold for responders’ acceptance was 
37.4% [10]. 
Several models have been proposed to explain such fair behavior observed in human 
subjects. The inequity aversion model assumes that humans care about not only the 
benefit they receive but also the equality between them and others [9], which is still based 
on the rationality assumption but with a different utility function. In the meantime, studies 
with evolutionary game theory-based models have suggested that including additional 
information in UG promotes the evolution of fairness. Nowak et al. (2000) showed that 
fairness can evolve when the information about responder’s acceptance levels 
(reputations) are known to proposers [11]. Page and Nowak (2002) showed that empathy, 
i.e., players’ tendency to equate offer amounts with their own acceptance thresholds, can 
also contribute to the evolution of fairness [12]. Moreover, it is also known that spatial 
structures including regular and complex networks facilitate the evolution of fairness [4, 
13-16]. However, these additional assumptions are not free from problems. The inequality 
aversion model does not explain why such aversion exists or evolves. The reputation model 
does not consider the possibility that responders with reputations for high acceptance 
levels may lose opportunities to participate in games because proposers would tend to 
avoid them. The empathy model does not correctly represent actual human behaviors that 
typically show different offer amounts and acceptance thresholds. Spatial structures are 
typically assumed to be static in the previous studies, but they are the representation of 
social relationships of human individuals and therefore they must change quite dynamically 
at the time scales of behavioral evolution.  
Here we propose a new evolutionary model of UG to show that fairness can evolve without 
additional information such as reputation, empathy, or spatial structure. Instead, our 
model assumes probabilistic nature in players’ decision making, which is a reasonable 
assumption given that human decision making is often made probabilistically. Based on the 
idea of this probabilistic decision making, in our model, players randomly choose their 
interaction parameters for proposers, 𝑝′  (offer amount), and for responders, 𝑞′ 
(acceptance threshold), from a normal distribution with standard deviation σ whose means 
are defined by their genotypes 𝑝 and 𝑞. Moreover, in the earlier studies, UG is conducted 
only once between two players as the name (“ultimatum”) implies. In contrast, we consider 
the case that UG may be played more than once with some probability, 𝑟. This is also 
reasonable because negotiation in real humans often needs more than one interaction. We 
thus name our model the Not Quite Ultimatum Game (NQUG) model. See Methods for more 
details of the model.  
Results 
We first conducted systematic computer simulations starting with an initial population of players 
with randomly generated strategies using a preliminary version of the model that does not allow 
repetition of games (see Methods). Parameter settings we used were as follows: population size 
n = 1000; mutation range ϵ =0.005; length of a simulation run = 10,000 generations.  
Figure 1 summarizes the simulation results for varying σ. Compared to the original UG (𝜎 = 0), 
the characteristic offer amount of proposers (?̅?) increased greatly for higher values of σ. This is 
because the probabilistic fluctuations of responders’ decisions increase the risk of rejection and 
the proposers will thus need to increase their offer amounts in order to avoid being rejected. In 
other words, fairness in offer amounts evolved just by increasing randomness in players’ 
decision making. In this experiment, the value of σ were assumed to be the same for both 
proposers and responders. We also studied cases where σ is different between proposers and 
responders; see Supplementary Information (Fig. S3) for more details. However, this 
modification did not alter the qualitative interpretation of the results compared to cases with an 
identical value. Therefore, we used the same  value for both proposers and responders 
hereafter. 
In the meantime, Figure 1 also shows that increasing σ does not affect evolution of the 
characteristic acceptance threshold (?̅?). To explore possibilities for both ?̅? and ?̅? to evolve 
toward higher values, we introduced an additional assumption to the preliminary model. 
Specifically, we introduced a new parameter, 𝑟, a probability for players to repeat playing the 
game again if an offer is rejected. We call this full version the Not Quite Ultimatum Game 
(NQUG) model (see Methods for details). Note that the repetition of games makes sense only in 
the UG with probabilistic decision making, but not in the original UG, because repeating games 
do not produce any different outcome in the original UG where the players’ decisions are made 
deterministically.  
It has been reported that fairness is likely to appear in repeated UG based on reciprocity [17]. 
Compared to that, our NQUG model is simply based on probabilistic decision making and does 
not require any information about the past that would be needed for reciprocity to function.  
Figure 2 shows simulation results with the NQUG model, illustrating how the new parameter r 
influences the evolution of characteristic offer amounts ( ?̅? , Fig. 2A) and characteristic 
acceptance thresholds (?̅?, Fig. 2B). All the other parameters were set to the same values as used 
in Fig. 1. It was observed that, when 𝑟  is relatively high (i.e., 𝑟 ~ 0.8  or higher), the 
characteristic acceptance thresholds evolved toward a higher value when σ is positive (Fig. 2B), 
because rejection may become a more attractive alternative than accepting low offers for 
responders if repeating the game is possible. Consequently, proposers’ characteristic offer 
amounts also evolved toward a comparably higher value (Fig. 2A), although this trend does not 
continue to hold for higher σ, where responders tend to accept low offers frequently even though 
their thresholds are high. We also note that, when 𝑟 is moderate (i.e. 0.10 ≤ 𝑟 ≤ 0.80), the 
general trend of ?̅? is slightly decreasing (Fig. 2A and Fig. S6). This can be understood as follows. 
For 𝑟 = 0, the proposers need to increase the offer amount in order to avoid rejection, as 
described in the preliminary model (Fig. 1). However, when 𝑟 is moderately positive, there is a 
reasonable chance that a game is repeated again even if the offer is rejected. This makes it 
possible for the proposers to act more boldly and thus reduces the offer amount a little, because 
even low offers may sometimes be accepted if the game can be repeated. Nevertheless, when 
𝑟 is very high, it works for responders’ benefit, as described above. In such cases, proposers 
have to increase their offer amount again to adapt to the responders’ high demands. This is why 
a non-monotonic behavior is observed for ?̅? when 𝑟 is varied from 0 to 1 (Fig. S6). 
Figure 3 summarizes the results presented in Figs. 2A and 2B in a single ?̅? - ?̅? space, showing 
how the evolved strategy changes when σ and 𝑟 are varied. When 𝜎 = 0 (Fig. 3, bottom-left), 
the game is equivalent to the original UG because repetition of game play does not make any 
difference in this case. Therefore, the players’ average strategy always converges to the most 
rational behavior (low ?̅?, nearly zero ?̅?) regardless of r. As σ increases, however, the average 
strategy shifts rightward toward higher ?̅?. For r ~ 0.7 or less, the increase of ?̅? is not significant, 
but for r ~ 0.8 and higher, the average strategy moves diagonally along the “perfect empathy” 
line (?̅? = ?̅?), which indicates the evolution of fairness. It is also observed for higher σ and 
extremely high r (r ~ 1) that players tend to evolve to become “naysayers” (Fig. 3, top-right), 
always asking for more than what they would offer if they were proposers (?̅? < ?̅?) because the 
rejection probability is nearly zero. 
Discussion 
In this article, we proposed NQUG as a probabilistic version of UG where player’s decisions on 
offer amounts, acceptance thresholds and continuation of the game are all probabilistic. 
Simulation results demonstrated that fairness can naturally evolve for high σ and high (but not 
too high) r. High σ means more random fluctuations in players’ decisions on offer amounts and 
acceptance thresholds, which elevates the risk for proposers to be rejected and thus the 
characteristic offer amount (?̅?) evolves to higher values. High r means greater likelihood of 
continuation of game play if rejection occurs, which works to responders’ advantage and thus 
the characteristic acceptance threshold (?̅?) also evolves to higher values.  
It is already reported that noise at selection process also promotes the evolution of fairness [18, 
19]. Such noise allows less adaptive players to survive, which contributes to the evolution of 
fairness, because offers based on rational, profit-maximizing behavioral principles can be 
rejected by such less adaptive players. Our model is different from those previous studies, 
because we consider the noise at the individual decision making level, instead of the noise at the 
evolutionary level.  
Our model is still limited in several aspects. We assumed that the probability distribution used in 
decision making is identical for all individuals, which is obviously not the case in real humans. 
Furthermore, the repetition probability r was assumed to be constant regardless of the number 
of repetitions, which may be unrealistic. The repetition probability also could be different for 
different pairs of individuals depending on their relationships. These model extensions are 
interesting issues to be addressed in the future. 
Finally, we do not claim that the probabilistic nature of NQUG is the primary explanation of the 
fair behavior observed in human subjects in UG. Rather, the evolutionary origins of fairness are 
probably a combination of several mechanisms proposed and studied so far (e.g., inequality 
aversion, reputation, empathy, spatial structure, probabilistic nature, etc.). The main 
contribution of our NQUG model is to show that a simple randomness in players’ decision making 
can, by itself, account for a substantial increase in proposer’s offer amounts and responders’ 
acceptance thresholds. 
Methods 
The preliminary model 
This model describes the evolution of strategies among n players over time. In the preliminary 
model, each individual player i has two genetically determined traits, 𝒑𝒊 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏] and 𝒒𝒊 ∈ [𝟎, 𝟏]. 
The trait 𝒑𝒊 is the characteristic amount of offers the player i makes when he is a proposer, 
while the trait 𝒒𝒊 is the characteristic acceptance threshold he uses when he is a responder. The 
player i’s strategy is thus represented by a two dimensional point (𝒑𝒊, 𝒒𝒊) in a unit square [4, 11]. 
Let (𝒑𝟏, 𝒒𝟏) and (𝒑𝟐, 𝒒𝟐) be the strategies of the proposer and the responder, respectively. Then 
the proposer decides the actual offer amount 𝒑𝟏
′  probabilistically by sampling it from a 
truncated normal distribution centered at 𝒑𝟏  within the interval [0, 1], i.e., 
𝒑𝟏
′  ~ 𝑵(𝒑𝟏, 𝝈
𝟐) conditional on 𝟎 ≤ 𝒑′𝟏 ≤ 𝟏, where σ is a global model parameter that specifies the 
standard deviation of players’ decision making before truncation. Similarly, the responder 
decides the acceptance threshold probabilistically by sampling it from a truncated normal 
distribution centered at 𝒒𝟐 within the interval [0, 1], i.e., 𝒒𝟐
′  ~ 𝑵(𝒒𝟐, 𝝈
𝟐) conditional on 𝟎 ≤ 𝒒′𝟐 ≤
𝟏. If 𝒑𝟏
′ ≥ 𝒒𝟐
′ , the offer is accepted and the proposer and the responder obtain 𝟏 − 𝒑𝟏
′  and 𝒑𝟏
′  as 
their payoffs, respectively. Otherwise, the offer is rejected, and neither receives anything. In 
the initial setting, the strategies of players are randomly generated. The model simulates 
evolutionary games in the following steps: First in each game play, two players are randomly 
selected from the population, one as a proposer and the other as a responder. The above steps 
are repeated n2 times so that each player will participate in 2n games on average. After the n2 
game plays are completed, a new population of players is produced by repeatedly creating an 
offspring from a parent sampled from the current population of players using their accumulated 
payoffs as selection probabilities. The offspring inherits its parent’s strategy (𝒑, 𝒒) with small 
random mutations (in [−𝛜, +𝛜]) added to the original values within the range [0, 1]. This repeats 
until the new population has n players. These steps described above constitute one generation 
in the simulation. Each simulation run continues for a fixed number of generations. 
 
The NQUG model 
Each time the game is repeated between two players, their roles are preserved but their 
decisions (𝑝1
′  and 𝑞2
′ ) are sampled from the aforementioned truncated normal distributions. The 
repetition ends when either the offer is accepted by the responder or the players decide to 
discontinue the game (which occurs with probability 1−r after each rejection). 
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Figure 1. Simulation results obtained using the preliminary model. Averages of characteristic 
offer amounts (?̅?) and acceptance thresholds (?̅?) are plotted over varying σ. Each data point is 
obtained by averaging p and q among all the players over the last 2,000 generations of each 
simulation run and then averaging the measurement over 10 independent simulation runs. 
Error bars represent standard deviations. The average payoffs and the typical simulation runs 
are shown in Supplementary Information (Figs. S1 and S2, respectively).  
 
 
 
 Figure 2. Simulation results obtained using the NQUG model. Averages of characteristic offer 
amounts (?̅?, A) and acceptance thresholds (?̅?, B) are plotted for varying r and σ. As in Fig. 1, 
each data point is obtained by averaging p and q among all the players over the last 2,000 
generations of each simulation run and then averaging the measurement over 10 independent 
simulation runs. Error bars represent standard deviations. The average payoffs and the typical 
simulation runs are shown in Supplementary Information (Figs. S4 and S5, respectively). Both 
?̅? and ?̅? evolved to high values when r is high. Additional results of a more comprehensive 
parameter sweep experiment are provided in Supplementary Information (Fig. S6). 
 
 
Figure 3. Summary of the results shown in Figs. 2A and 2B, where visualized in a ?̅? - ?̅? space. 
Each curve corresponds to simulation results over varying σ while r is fixed. The values of σ are 
increased from 0.00 (left) to 0.10 at intervals of 0.01. Each marker represents the average of 10 
independent simulation runs obtained with particular (r, σ) values. The diagonal line shows ?̅? = 
?̅? (perfect empathy). Below the line, the bottom-left area corresponds to rational strategies 
predicted by traditional economics theory, while the top-right area corresponds to fair strategies 
observed experimentally. Above the line, the top-right area corresponds to what we call 
“nay-saying” behaviors, where responders tend to ask for more than what they would offer if 
they were proposers (?̅? < ?̅?). Such behaviors arise in our model for higher σ and very high r. 
 
